Grumbling in Pakistan Spells More Trouble for the US

Since the Afghan campaign started in October 2001, the US has made extensive use of Pakistan as a forward base for intelligence operations. Recognizing that this has endangered the Pakistani government's popularity at home and throughout the Islamic world, the US continues rewarding it monetarily while strongly endorsing President Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October 1999 military coup. This week, visiting US officials re-affirmed their support for Musharraf – even as he authorizes new missile tests sure to provoke arch-enemy India.

The Dangers of Success

The CIA and FBI are now entrenched in Pakistan, gathering intelligence on terrorist whereabouts and directing the Pakistani military to perform highly dangerous operations against Taliban fighters on the Afghan border. The last such raid occurred Wednesday, when the authorities "cracked down" on 2 tribes with alleged al Qaeda links. Last week saw a major operation, resulting in 8 Taliban killed and 18 captured (though other sources claimed a higher body count). The Pakistani security forces have become America's proxy army – and they aren't very happy about it.

Ironically, American success in Pakistan may be endangering its future operations there – as well as Musharraf himself. (After all, a president brought to power by the military can also be deposed by the military). In the end, it is not the enraged Islamic mobs that could ruin America's anti-terrorist activities in Pakistan. However, an offended military could, like a coiled snake, become more dangerous when feeling vulnerable.

US Provocations – Well-Timed or Tactless?

Recently, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage caused great displeasure when he diplomatically stated, "I do not think that affection for working with us extends up and down the rank-and-file of the Pakistani security community."

Sensitive to this, the Pakistanis then did something rather unusual last Thursday, bringing journalists on a field trip of sorts, to watch the carnage wrought by Pakistani Special Forces against Taliban militants. According to AFP, in direct response to American criticisms

"...foreign and local media were whisked by army helicopter from Islamabad to a deadly operation on the wild northwest frontier with Afghanistan, to witness Cobra gunships and Pakistan's toughest commandos smash an al-Qaeda and Taliban hideout. Eight fighters were killed and 18 captured.

It was the first time Pakistan's army gave journalists a front-seat at an al-Qaeda operation, and it coincided both with Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali's visit to Washington and US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's scheduled arrival in Pakistan."

US Central Command chief John Abizaid, known for his recent role in Iraq, arrived Monday in Islamabad, as did Armitage and his assistant for South Asia, Christina Rocca. The latter two had spent Sunday in Afghanistan. The level of Pakistani "cooperation" was high on the list of topics for discussion.

FBI Strategy: Monitoring the Afghan Border

While the FBI operates cells throughout Pakistan, the chief focus is the western border with Afghanistan. This is frequently described as being "lawless," "inhospitable," "anarchic" and "tribal." The mountainous border is hundreds of miles long and effectively impossible to control. President Musharraf recently told ABC that, "…sweeping and searching the entire area would require the whole Pakistani army." With chronically simmering tensions in Kashmir, this is a luxury Pakistan can't afford.

Besides the dangers and occasional setbacks, the US and Pakistani governments have enjoyed some successes. However, as Newsday reminds,

"…that border is not where the highest-ranking al-Qaida leaders captured in Pakistan so far have generally been tracked down. Abu Zubaydah, considered one of bin Laden's top lieutenants, was nabbed in a joint U.S.-Pakistani raid in March 2002 in Faisalabad, about 150 miles south of Islamabad. Ramzi Binalshibh, suspected of helping plot the Sept. 11 attacks, was caught after a shoot-out in September 2002 in Karachi, a main Pakistani port on the Indian Ocean. And Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi, near the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. None of those cities is within 75 miles of the Afghan border."

The FBI and its director, Robert Mueller, have largely been exempt from the kind of criticism that the CIA and director George Tenet have – perhaps unfairly – received recently. This may have to do with the fact that the FBI answers to powerful Justice Department head and close Bush ally John Ashcroft – whose own pre-9/11 criticisms of the Bureau have been forgotten. Although fighting terrorists abroad is not in the FBI's traditional purview, in Pakistan it seems to be doing the CIA's job – perhaps too well.

A 'Vice-Like Grip'

Despite what the "clash of civilizations" crowd might assume, the current displeasure of Pakistani security forces – only heightened by Richard Armitage's blunt accusation – is not primarily religious-based. Rather, as an institution the ISI is feeling embarrassed. The once all-powerful agency feels, quite rightly, that the US has muscled in on its territory. According to a provocative recent article from the Asia Times, the FBI "fingerhold" in Pakistan has now been turned into

"…a vice-like grip through an ever-expanding network that has infiltrated, to various degrees, Pakistan's armed forces, the police and intelligence agencies… the FBI cells have established direct control over the law enforcing agencies, such as the police, who take orders from FBI agents. In return, they are believed to be handsomely rewarded financially. The ISI is aware of who is on the FBI's payroll, but can do little about it."

During the Soviet-Afghan conflict the CIA was relegated to Islamabad. The agency provided cash and weapons, whereas the ISI worked directly with the Afghan mujahideen. This time around, the FBI is working "autonomously," from nationwide headquarters, and is equipped with communications tracking devices and eavesdropping equipment. High-level officials are now expressing their unhappiness with this situation:

"…according to one ISI person posted in Karachi, who requested not to be named when talking to Asia Times Online, 'After September 11, 2001, we were given instructions to work along with FBI operators. Initially they were given a room in the ISI's operations office. They used to give commands to us, and we had to obey them. For instance, once they asked us to send a packet somewhere. We packed it and informed them that the parcel was ready. They unpacked the parcel and asked an ISI employee to repack it in front of them. This is the way the FBI operators showed their domination over the ISI staff. At first they asked us to coordinate in operations. Later on they were given a separate place of work, then they cultivated local police officers, and several times they did not bother to inform the ISI about their operations.'"

Further examples of American interference in Pakistani security affairs only amplify these concerns:

"…according to well-placed sources in the Pakistani intelligence community, some the country's former clandestine operations have now been curtailed, such as one involving the national carrier, Pakistan International Airline (PIA). PIA was once extensively used for "back-channel diplomatic activities", such as shifting missiles under the cover of routine cargo. But under heavy US pressure, PIA's reservation system is now hosted in Texas through the Sabre Group, and the movement of each and every passenger is carefully monitored, as is the cargo."

Not only flight details are being run from stateside. The FBI now also has the ability to monitor all transactions sent to and from private Pakistani accounts – something which even the Pakistani government itself cannot legally do. A Pakistani banking official took a more philosophical line on this policy than most Americans would, stating that the illegal action "…is the price we have to pay for ensuring that a useful channel like remittances is not abused by people bent on creating upheavals."

This isn't the first time that Pakistani security officials have expressed their displeasure. On 28 April 2002, disgruntled former ISI chief Hamid Gul revealed that the FBI has 16 offices throughout Pakistan. As a result, claimed one newspaper, "the US will increase its interference in the northern areas of Pakistan, which will lead to (the) complete slavery of the region."

More recently, Gul told CNN in September that the bombing campaign was "a total failure in strategy":

"…they (Americans) should have asked Pakistan to continue our contacts with the Taliban…we would have found OBL (Osama bin Laden). But now it is very difficult. It is like searching for a needle in a haystack."

Dangers from Within

Indeed, perhaps a less bombastic approach would have been more fruitful. However, the opposite strategy was employed, and now its logical conclusion may have been reached

A document reprinted by the Asia Times, claimed to be "doing the rounds," is a direct threat to President Musharraf – not from the masses, but from his own security forces. The letter, which claims to be from Pakistan's "full colonels," calls on parliament to overturn Pervez Musharraf "and his handpicked gang," who have turned Pakistan "from the fort of Islam into a slaughterhouse of the Muslims." The letter demands an inquiry into the 1999 coup, insinuating that Musharraf owes his presidency to corrupt Supreme Court justices. It also claims that prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan high-ranking army officers were awarded large parcels of land by the government. Could this by a sign of rumblings from within?

Damage Control

This and other ominous developments led Richard Armitage this week to hastily reverse his previous denunciations. On Monday, he attempted to smooth things over, saying that the US-Pakistan relationship was solid. Simultaneously, a strong statement was made that the military fully backs Musharraf. A day later, Prime Minister Mir Zafurallah Khan Jamali – just back from Washington – also announced that everyone is happy.

Finally, a group of 5 US senators visited and "commended" Pakistan's participation in the war on terror. But does such a mad scramble for controlling the damage have other implications? After all, on Tuesday the administration-friendly Washington Times claimed that the US still suspects the ISI of aiding Taliban fighters.

Finally, Afghanistan: From Bad to Worse?

Last week, French journalist Giles Jacquier armed with a secret camera, discovered over 50 Taliban fighters near Khost, near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border:

"…Mr. Jacquier, a seasoned newsman, said that his visit to Khost was one of the scariest he'd ever undertaken as a journalist, and that all activity in and around the tribal homelands on both sides of the border with Afghanistan presented, in his eyes, 'permanent danger' for Pakistan, because it was not under 'government control.'"

The "porous border" issue has been used as a tacit point of leverage for the Americans, holding Musharraf in line through the agency of Hamid Karzai, Afghan "president." Karzai is America's proxy diplomat, while both the Afghan and Pakistani armies have become two flanks of America's proxy military.

However, grumblings in the Pakistani ranks are not the only problem for the US today. Bloody factional fighting between powerful warlords has erupted again in the north, and Taliban attacks are set to increase dramatically, says the US – as was proven Thursday. In the end, America's heavy ongoing intervention in the region could prove its undoing. The US may have to rethink the character of its involvement in Pakistan if it wants even to maintain the status quo in a country that remains highly volatile.

Indeed, as a detailed new report suggests, the US is now trapped in the middle of a highly combustible – and eminently predictable – regional power struggle:

"…Western and Afghan intelligence officials in Kandahar claim that Pakistan's intelligence agencies are once again covertly backing the Taliban resurgence as they did in the 1990s. Islamabad strongly denies such charges, but it is clear that President Pervez Musharraf and the Army wants to retain influence in the Afghan Pashtun belt and the Taliban are its only allies to do so. Pakistan also wants to challenge India's influence in Kabul and restrain the powerful former Northern Alliance. If leading US officials such as Armitage are prepared to turn a blind eye to these policies, it is clear too many Afghans and Pakistanis will suffer the backlash from supporting another round of extremism."

As anti-interventionists have said all along, it's much easier to get into such a situation than to get out. But the US, overconfident that it could arbitrate peace and impose democracy, has now gotten itself firmly stuck, between Pak and a hard place.